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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now more than five years since the passage of the landmark
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), but instead of flourishing
competition, the competitive local carrier sector has experienced a financial

1. T. Randolph Beard et al., Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Exploration into
the Future of Industry Structurefor the "Last Mile" in Local Telecommunications Markets
(Phoenix Ctr. Policy Paper No. 12, Nov. 2001), available at http://www.phoenixcenter.org/pcpp/PCPP12.pdf.
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meltdown. 2 So, what happened?
Basically, the issue can be narrowed to several fundamental
misconceptions about the underlying economics of the telecommunications
business by all of the major stakeholders, including Wall Street,
policymakers, and would-be entrepreneurs. Namely, it appeared that
everybody believed that: (a) entry into the local market would be relatively
inexpensive; (b) the market immediately would be capable of sustaining
multiple local access networks; and (c) as a result of their desire to enter
the long-distance business, incumbents would gladly embrace competitive
entry.3
As this paper will discuss, however: (a) entry into the local sector is
an extremely expensive business, requiring firms to incur huge sunk costs
and achieve scale economies quickly; (b) under current and foreseeable
market conditions, local markets will only be able to sustain a few "lastmile" access networks (i.e., high concentration); and (c) incumbents were
prepared to-and in fact did-go to great lengths in order to deter entry. 4
As such, just as it was prior to 1996, one of the key unresolved issues
in telecommunications restructuring continues to be the proverbial "last
mile"--that is, the last segment of the network necessary to connect the
customer. 6 Indeed, despite the somewhat regular deployment of state-ofthe-art national and regional long-haul networks and metropolitan fiber
rings by a number of carriers, the deployment of alternative networks
comes to a screeching halt when it reaches into the local exchange, leaving
dominant control of most switching and transport facilities, and particularly

2. For example, according to Webmergers.com at least 750 Internet companies folded
from January 2000 through December 2001. Moreover, in 2001 alone, 113 infrastructure
providers went out of business (up from 17 for all of 2000), and 207 access providers went
out of business (up from 19 for all of 2000). Year End Shutdowns Rpt.: Shutdowns More
Than Doubled in 2001, WEBMERGERS.COM, at http://www.webmergers.comleditorial/
article.php?id=49 (last visited Jan. 22, 2002). Unfortunately, however, it does not look like
things are going to improve any time soon. See, e.g., Ann Davis, Upstart Phone Companies
Find Competition Just Got Grimmer,WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 24.
3. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, Dumb Deals 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 2001, at 38-41.
4. Unfortunately, public policies did little to help the process either. See generally
MARK NAFrEL & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE WAR: THE
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (2000).

Whether there will be any significant improvements remains to be seen. See, e.g., Peter S.
Goodman, FCCSitting Out Telecom War, WASH. POST, May 3, 2001, at El, E9.
5. While the "last mile" of the local exchange network is perhaps the most challenging
trial for competition policy, the supply-side economics of many other components of the
local exchange network, including switching and transport, also prohibit large-numbers
competition.
6. The "last mile" is a term of reference and is not meant to describe a "measured
mile." Instead, the "last mile" can be as small as a few feet or yards.
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the "last mile" or "last yard" of the local exchange network, to the
incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC").7 In order to bypass the
economic bottleneck for local access, therefore, the competitive local
exchange carrier ("CLEC") industry has been faced with the core question
of transaction cost economics: is it more efficient to buy local access via
unbundling, special access, and so forth from the reluctant incumbent, and
conduct their transactions in the market, or build their own local access
network from scratch, and bring the transaction out of the market and into
the firm?8 Unfortunately, the problem is that under current and foreseeable
market conditions, neither option is particularly economically appealing.
On the one hand, given the incumbents' near-complete dominance of
the local access market, there really is no competitive "market" where a
firm can purchase local access at just and reasonable rates that will be
provisioned on a timely basis. Acquiring needed inputs (i.e., elements)
from the incumbents at just and reasonable rates and provisioning intervals
is no cake walk either. After all, dominant firms do not typically facilitate
the demise of their dominance. This is not an irrational concept, because no
firm will ever be enthusiasticabout consciously going against its own selfinterests by selling its rivals their key input of production (i.e., loops). 9
Indeed, while the 1996 Act requires the ILECs to provide such elements,
the Act did little to fundamentally alter economic incentives. So long as
this inherent wholesale-supplier/retail-competitor conflict exists between
an ILEC and a CLEC, then the ILECs' ability to manipulate prices for

7. See, e.g., Rebecca Blumenstein, Telecom Act Hasn't Delivered Promised Price
Relief, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, atB1, B4.
8. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(Free Press 1985).
9. But c.f. Edie Herman, FCC Targets Mid-December for Start of UNE Review,
COMM. DAILY, Nov. 30, 2001, at 3 (reporting FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief Dorothy
Attwood's comments at a conference sponsored by the Association of Local
Telecommunication Services ("ALTS")). According to Herman:
Attwood said "no one disputes" those complaints [against the RBOCs' wholesale
practices] but she urged audience to listen to call[s] ... for ILECs and CLECs to
try to work together to resolve disputes over UNE provisioning before they
escalated to FCC or state regulators. When [an] audience of competitive business
people groaned,Attwood said that wasn't [a] bad idea because ILECs knew they
couldn't throw out their statutory requirements so they appearedto be willing to
cooperate more. "I think it's in the interests of incumbents to be an efficient
wholesaler," she said.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. Unfortunately, the defense of many CLECs to the current financial collapse is that it
was not unreasonable for them to base a business plan on a federal law, enacted by
Congress, signed by the president, and upheld as constitutional by the courts, that guarantees
them the right to unbundled network elements. While this may be true, this is a legal
argument, not an economic one.
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elements and to control quality leaves sufficient room for ILECs to
sabotage transactions, defined as the ability to increase the cost of a rival's
key input of production by nonprice behavior between itself and CLECs."
On the other hand, as the relative paucity of alternative local networks
and rampant bankruptcy in the CLEC industry demonstrates, the economics
of self-supply are not particularly compelling either. As explained below,
telecommunications is an extremely expensive business, and many CLECs
are discovering to their dismay and chagrin that they cannot achieve
sufficient economies of scale, scope, or density to warrant the capital
required to build various components, even relatively small components, of
the local exchange network from the ground up. The large sunk costs
required to construct local exchange networks greatly increase the risk of
entry and severely limit the number of financially viable alternative "lastmile" networks in most local markets. 12 Simply put, the supply-side
economies of the local exchange market prohibit competition among large
numbers of network-basedfirms. The hope for large-numbers competition
among network-based firms under current and foreseeable market
13
conditions is sheer fantasy.
Accordingly, the tenuous relationship between a reluctant wholesale
ILEC supplier and its retail competitor-consumer CLECs, as well as the
substantial scale economies and sunk costs required to participate in the
local exchange market, suggest that neither of the two alternatives for
facilitating competition offer substantial promise as a long-term solution to
monopoly in the local exchange marketplace. So, what to do? How do we
go from "one" firm to "many" firms in an economically efficient mannerthe raison d'tre of market "restructuring"? This Article will explore the
11. The definition of the term "sabotage" articulated supra originates in T. Randolph
Beard et al., Regulation, Vertical Integrationand Sabotage,49 J. INDUS. EcON. 319 (2001),
and will be used passin. For a full explanation of the sabotage concept, see Section IV.D
ihfra.
12. Limitations on the number of viable firms are not restricted to the "last mile."
Rather, any segment of the network characterized by sunk costs and scale economies has
limited opportunities for successful entry. For a thorough discussion of the effects of sunk
costs on entry and industry structure, see JOHN SUTrrrON, SUNK COST AND MARKET
STRUCTURE: PRICE COMPETITION, ADVERTISING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION

(1991). For a similar analysis applied to the communications industries, see Jerry B. Duvall
& George S. Ford, Changing Industry Structure: The Economics of Entry and Price
Competition (Phoenix Ctr. Policy Paper No. 10, Apr. 2001), available at http:llwww.
phoenix-center.org/pccp/PCPPlOFinal.pdf [hereinafter Policy Paper No. 10].
13. Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael K. Powell, Address at the
National Summit on Broadband Deployment (Oct. 25, 2001) available at http:llftp.fcc.gov/
Speeches/PowellI2001/spmkpll0.html; Ivan Seidenberg, Address at the Goldman Sachs
Communacopia X Conference (Oct. 4, 2001) at http:llwww.verizonld.comlnews/index.cfm?
Article=1 14.
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merits of an untapped market-based third option for local access: the
alternative distribution company ("ADCo"), which essentially
is a
4
wholesale "carriers' carrier" for local network "last-mile" access.
The "carriers' carrier" is not a new concept to telecommunications.
Many long-haul networks, both national and regional, are built and/or
operated as a "carriers' carrier." The economic forces that create a
wholesale market in the long-distance industry, where about six nationwide
and numerous regional networks support well over 500 retailers, are no less
present in the local exchange.' 5 Indeed, those economic forces-economies
of scale, economies of density, and sunk costs-are even more important in
the local exchange than in long-distance, where fiber deployment in
metropolitan markets is about twelve times as expensive as long-haul fiber
networks. ' 6 As such, the case for a "carriers' carrier" in the local exchange
market at this stage of the telecommunications industry restructuring
process is compelling.
More importantly, given its wholesale entry strategy, the ADCo
provides for new entrants a viable economic solution to the problems raised
by the inherent incentive of an incumbent unduly to discriminate to protect
its profits. This issue of incentives is key to understanding the current ills
of the market, as it is now clear that policymakers significantly
underestimated the significant incentives of the incumbents to unduly
discriminate against their rivals, not to mention also underestimating the
entry costs of the local market. In fact, it is becoming readily apparent that,
given the current and foreseeable underlying economics of the industry, no
amount of regulation-with perhaps the exception of total structural
separation-can ever fully mitigate the cross-incentives of the incumbents'
wholesale-supplier/retail-competitor relationships with CLECs.
To explore the merits of the ADCo in detail, this Article, using an
analysis first set forth in Phoenix Center Policy Paper No. 10,17 will briefly
14. An "ADCo" is a very different concept from a "LoopCo." A "LoopCo" is formed
by the structural separation of the incumbent's local access network facilities from the
incumbent's marketing operations. See, e.g., Roy L. Morris, A Proposal to Promote
Telephone Competition: The LoopCo Plan, availableat http://hometown.aol.com/RoyMll/
LoopCo/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2002); Maev Sullivan, Loop Co is the Only Game
in Town, COMM. WEEKLY INT'L, July 16, 2001. An ADCo, however, is the entry of a
completely new firm that contemplates an exclusive wholesale entry strategy for local
access from the outset.
15. See Trends in Telephone Service, Industry Analysis Division, FCC Common Carrier
Bureau, 10-12 tbl.10.6 (2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/
Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend200.pdf.
16. Dan Sweeney, City of Lights - The Pricing of Fiber Build-outs: A Special Report,
COMPETITIVE CARRIER, Aug. 1, 2001, at 6, 7.
17. See Policy Paper No. 10, supra note 12.
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explain that given the underlying economics of the market, and that much
of the entry costs of a telecommunications network are sunk, industry
concentration in telecommunications markets is expected to be relatively
high. 8 Accordingly, expecting a large number of competitors in local
access markets-particularly a large number of network-based
competitors-is entirely unreasonable.' 9
Second, this Article will evaluate in a summary fashion the two
primary forms of entry observed since the passage of the 1996 Act:
Option 1:
Element-Dependent Entry ("EDE"): An entry
strategy where the new entrant relies heavily on the
elements of a reluctant incumbent, rather than build
its own network, and purchases local access from the
incumbent via special access lines, high-capacity
circuits (Tl's), full resale, individual unbundled
network elements ("UNE"), or even the entire UNE
platform ("UNE-P"--a combination of the local
loop, unbundled switching, and transport elements).
This form of entry includes those entrants relying on
the elements of the incumbent until their own
networks are deployed (i.e., a "smart-build"
strategy). As these firms must also sink huge
amounts of capital in equipment to enter, however,
these firms are certainly "facilities-based" entrants,
albeit not "network-dependent" entrants as discussed
in the next paragraph.
Option 2:
Network-Based Entry ("NBE"): A strategy where a
CLEC seeks to build its own local access network
from scratch with little or no reliance on the
incumbent's network.
Third, this Article will explore the full impact of the incumbents'
incentive to frustrate competitive entry by setting forth a simple economic
model that analyzes the incentives of a vertically integrated supplier-one
18. See also T. Randolph Beard & George S. Ford, Competition in Local and LongOF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (Gary Madden & Scott J. Savage eds., forthcoming

Distance Telecommunications Markets, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK

2002).
19. Given the geographic specificity of a telecommunications plant, it is possible for
many firms to produce telecommunications services. However, very few firms actually will
compete in the same geographic area. For example, there are many cable television firms,
but nearly every cable system is a monopoly.
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that operates in both the upstream wholesale market and in the downstream
retail market-to provide inputs of production to actual or potential
competitors. For consistency with the reality of building a local exchange
plant, this model assumes that there are economies of scale or density in the
downstream retail market. 20 Also assumed for modeling purposes is that
services are profitably supplied. As the model reveals, the incentives to
supply the "upstream" or "wholesale" market at cost-based prices, thus
facilitating competition in the "downstream" or "retail" market, are
inversely related to the market share of the firm in the retail marketirrespective of whether the firm is an ILEC or a CLEC, though the CLEC
has no incentive to sabotage its customers. The model illustrates that there
is a fundamental tension between the benefits of large scale, wholesale
operation, and the disincentives that firms with large retail operations have
to "share" those wholesale benefits with retail competitors through the
efficient sales of network facilities.
Finally, this Article uses the model to compare the incentives of the
vertically integrated suppliers to those of wholesale-only suppliers
(ADCos). As explained below, given the existence of the ILECs'
discriminatory incentives resulting from the current and foreseeable
economic conditions of the U.S. telecommunications industry, the model
suggests that the most probable and viable long-term, competitive market
structure involves a substantialpresence by an unintegrated, but larger
wholesale supplier2 -in other words, an ADCo-to function efficiently.
Accordingly, their presence in the market should be welcomed and
encouraged.
II. BASIC ISSUES OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND ENTRY
A.

Introduction

Elementary economic analysis can shed considerable light on the
long-run structure of the U.S. telecommunications industry, an issue of

20. The model assumes that either economies of scale or density exists, but the term
"economies of scale" is used throughout this paper. "Economies of scale" describes the
relationship between costs and frrm/network size. 'Economies of density" describes the
relationship of costs and output for a firm/network of a fixed size. Either interpretation of
the relationship of cost and size/output is consistent with the analysis of this paper.
21. By "large" we mean large enough to achieve sufficient economies of scale for the
market being served. While our focus is generally on the last mile or last yard, economies of
scale can be substantial in other areas. For example, the systems and electronic interfaces
required for a CLEC to transact successfully with an ILEC may be subject to scale
economies. If true, then this "provisioning" interface may be best provided on a wholesale
basis.
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enormous importance. The role of competition policy is to create an
environment in which feasible long-term arrangements-those that are
consistent with robust, commercially successful local competition-can
Industry
take place. One example of such analysis is provided in Changing
•• 22
Structure: The Economics of Entry and Price Competition. In this policy
paper, Drs. Duvall and Ford show that the equilibrium level of
concentration in telecommunications markets will be relatively high. The
presence of sunk costs, in any industry, limits the number offirms that can
profitably serve a market. The largersunk costs are relative to market size,
the higher the equilibriumlevel of concentration.
More formally, Duvall and Ford show theoretically that the
equilibrium number of firms in a market (N*) is the integer part of:
N* =T--V-

(1)

K

where 4)is an index of the intensity of price competition () 0, where =0
for Bertrand, or highly intense, price competition, and 0) 1 for Coumot
competition in quantities), M is market size, - measures the sunk entry
costs, and 1/N* is the equilibrium level of industry concentration and is
equal to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HIE") under the assumption of
identical firms. 21 Put simply, the number of firms supplying a market is
positively related to the size of the market (M), but inversely related to the
intensity of price competition (4) and the sunk costs of entry (K). The
larger arefixed/sunk costs, other things constant, the fewer the firms that
can profitably supply the market and the higher is equilibrium industry
the more intense the price competition, the higher
concentration.Likewise, S24
the industry concentration.
The inability of local telecommunications markets to support high
levels of competition can be illustrated by example. Telecommunications
firm RCN targets residential customers in densely populated markets with
its own network facilities, over which it provides telephone, data, and video
services.2 According to its financial documents, RCN has $2.75 billion in
22. Policy Paper No. 10, supra note 12.
23. The models assume all firms are identical. The HHI, the sum of the squared market
shares of relevant firms, is a commonly used measure of industry concentration.
24. Generally, price competition is expected to be weakest in highly concentrated
markets. When entry requires sunk costs, however, this expectation can be invalid.
25. According to RCN's 10-Q Form, about 12% of RCN's phone customers are "offnet," supplied over the ILEC's network via resale. RCN CoP., 2001 THIRD QUARTER FORM
10-Q (Nov. 9, 2001), availableat http://www.rcn.com/investor/index.html.
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plant and passes about 1.5 million homes, or 1.1 million marketable
26
homes. Plant investment runs about $1,750 per home passed, $2,500 per
marketable home, or about $6,500 per customer. 7 A rough estimate of
RCN's monthly plant costs (assuming a 15% hurdle rate and 15-year
payoff) is about $25 per home passed. Average monthly revenue per
subscriber is about $130 and direct costs are about 46% of revenues,
implying a gross monthly margin of about $68 per subscriber. In order to
cover plant costs with its net revenues, RCN needs a penetration rate of
about 35% to 40%, and that is in the more densely populated markets
targeted by RCN over a network capable of generating services worth $130
per subscriber. Notably, if a 35% to 40% penetration rate is requiredfor
profitability, then only two firms can profitably service the same market,
and RCN and the incumbent make two.2 8 To construct an RCN-style
network for every household in the United States, the plant investment and
total entry
would be about $300 billion and $600 billion,
S 29costs
respectively. Clearly, network-based entry is incredibly costly and is not
something that is replicable by numerous firms in the same market.
Similarly, the metropolitan fiber rings and spurs needed to provide
service to large businesses are incredibly costly as well. Some fiber
companies estimate that fiber deployment in a metropolitan area routinely
costs $3 million per mile.30 Thus, construction of a large metro ring or mesh
could easily exceed $100 million." Further, most if not all of these costs
are sunk; 32roughly half of the costs of metropolitan fiber are installation
expenses. The services provided over metropolitan fiber networks vary, as
26. RCN CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.rcn.com/
investor/index.html. Marketable homes are those homes that RCN's network can
immediately serve.
27. Values are based on RCN's 1998, 1999, and 2000 Annual Reports. For example,
between 1999 and 2000, RCN's Plant and Property grew by $1.5 billion while its
marketable homes grew by about 550,000. In 1999, RCN's penetration rate into marketable
homes was about 40%. Id.; see also RCN CORP., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT (2000), availableat
http://www.rcn.com/investor/index.html; RCN CORP., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999),
availableat http://www.rcn.com/investor/index.html.
28. With a reasonable guess of the minimum penetration a firm needs to cover its costs,
the number of firms that can operate in a market is the integer part of the inverse of the
minimum penetration (e.g., 1/0.40 = 2.5).
29. These investment estimates are rough. Plant investment is estimated by assuming
the cost differentials and population distributions across density zones are similar to those
estimated by the HAI Model (v. 2.2.2), a total element long-run incremental cost model
developed by HAI and Associates, AT&T, and MCI-WorldCom. RCN's current network is
assumed to be deployed in the two most dense zones. Nonplant entry costs are assumed to
be about $1 for every $1 of plant (see Table 1 supra).
30. The costs of any particular installation vary widely. See Sweeney, supra note 16.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 7, 9.
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do the size and scope of these networks. Thus, simple profitability models
like the RCN example are difficult to construct. However, the fact that less
that the sunk costs in the
than 10% of buildings have fiber drops suggests
size. 33
market
to
relative
sizeable
are
network
The implication of the economic theory is clear: the number offirms
supplying a market is not unbounded when there are sunk costs. Given that
much of the entry cost of a telecommunications network is sunk and large
relative to market size, industry concentration in telecommunications
markets is expected to be relatively high-in other words, there will be few
firms in the market. Indeed, until recently, the presumption was that the
local exchange market was a natural monopoly (i.e., N* = 1). While the
technology and law governing the telecommunications industry has
changed, these changes have not totally altered the supply-side economics
of the industry. Large-numbers competition among network-based local
exchange carriers is forbidden by the supply-side economics of the
industry.
B.

Sunk Costs and the Necessity of Achieving Sufficient Economies
of Scale and Scope

The fact that economies of scale (or density) and sunk costs play a
key role in telecommunications network deployment goes without saying.
In order to achieve profitability in a reasonable time frame, therefore, the
large fixed costs of the plant must be averaged out over a large quantity of
services that are sold relatively quickly. Ignoring this reality has put many a
CLEC into bankruptcy.
An important misconception policymakers and Wall Street have about
the telecommunications industry is that entry into telecommunications is
somehow limited to just the cost of network construction and architecture.
Quite to the contrary, entry into the telecommunications business requires
the additional commitment of tremendous fixed and sunk costs to cover the
costs of billing systems, regulatory efforts and responses, pre-positive cash
flow, general administrative costs, and, perhaps most significant of all,
customer acquisition and retention costs.
For example, Douglas Galbi estimates AT&T's annual marketing
expenses to be approximately $2 billion per year from 1994 through 1997. 34
Galbi also provides evidence that marketing expenses in the long-distance
industry are subject to economies of scale. Other sources indicate that
33. Id. at 9. See also Yuki Noguchi, CityNet Wins $275 Million in Funding,
Washtech.com, Apr. 10, 2001, at http://www.washtech.com/news/telecom/8919-1.html.
34. Douglas A. Galbi, Some Costs of Competition 5 (Jan. 24, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Journal), availableat http://www.galbithink.org.
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acquisition costs for residential local or long-distance customers are about
$150 per customer, virtually all of which is sunk.35 For larger business
customers and buildings, where the stakes and margins
are relatively high,
6
sizeable.1
be
to
expected
are
costs
the acquisition
Similarly, regulatory costs are nontrivial entry investments. Industry
experts estimate that approximately 10% of the entry costs for metropolitan
fiber rings and spurs are related to obtaining government approval. In some
cases, "[d]eliberations involving local government entities, public utilities
and private claimants can extend well beyond a year, and in some cases
may never reach a successful conclusion, aborting the project before a
single fiber can be buried."37 Clearly, approval costs incurred for a project
later abandoned have little or no value and are thus sunk. As noted supra,
the average cost of a mile of fiber deployed in a metropolitan market is
estimated by some to be $3 million, the sunk costs related to regulatory
approval are nontrivial and may represent a formidable entry barrier.'s
Accordingly, the magnitude of nonplant entry costs is sizeable. Table
1 illustrates the proportion of facilities' investment (measured as net plant)
to total entry costs for a sample of CLECs. Entry costs are measured as the
spent portion of capital invested in the firm including debt and equity."
35. See For Whom, the Bells' Toll?, Bernstein Research, Feb. 1997, at 55-56; see also
Press Release, Juno Online Services, Inc., Juno Online Services, Inc. Reports Record Third
Quarter Results (Oct. 27, 1999), available at http://www.irconnect.comluntd/pages/newsreleases.shtml?d=20258.
36. See, e.g., Declaration of A. Daniel Kelley and Richard A. Chandler, HA
Consulting, Inc., WorldCom Comments, Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Attachment D
(June 11, 2001), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve .cgi?native-or_
pdf=pdf&id-document=6512660125); Brief of AT&T Corp., Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98,
Exhibit 1 (June 11, 2001), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/ prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native-or.pdf=pdf&id-document=6512660142.
37. Sweeney, supra note 16 at 9.
38. See id.
39. Entry cost is measured by total long-term debt, other liabilities, and equity
investments, minus cash and short-term investments. Plant is measured as net plant. All
figures compiled from company 10-Q forms for the second quarter of 2001. XO COMM.,
INC., 2001 SECOND QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http:/lwww.xo.com/

investors/financials/quarterlyeaings/XO200lQ2_Financials.pdf;
INC., 2001
SECOND QUARTER FORM
10-Q (Aug. 13,

ALLEGIANCE TELECOM,

2001),

available at

http://www.allegiancetelecom.com/pdf/2q_10q_2001.pdf;
RCN CORP., 2001 SECOND
QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 14, 2001), available at http:llwww.rcn.comlinvestor/press/
index.html; COVAD COMMS. GROUP, INC., 2001 SECOND QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 20,
2001), available at http://www.covad.com/companyinfo/investorrelations/documents/
COVD-10-Q-08-20-2001.PDF; MCLEOD, 2001 SECOND QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 14,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919943/000092838500002228/
0000928385-O0-002228.txt; TALK AMERICA (formerly Talk.Com), 2001 SECOND QUARTER
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Table 1. Entry Costs and Plant
Entry Costs (E)
(in thousands)

XO
Allegiance
RCN
Covad
McLeod
Talk America
Northpoint
ITCADeltacom
US LEC
Wgt. Average

$10,739
$2,083
$4,859
$2,414
$8,260
$429
$1,041
$1,036
$369

Net Plant (P)
(in thousands)
$3,505

$939
$2,331
$294
$3,220
$80
$455
$708
$191

E/P

P/E

$3.06
$2.22
$2.08
$8.20
$2.57
$5.37
$2.29
$1.46
$1.93
$3.06

34%
45%
48%
12%
39%
19%
44%
68%
52%
38%

As the table illustrates, investment in plant is typically a very small
proportion of total dollars invested. As Table 1 further demonstrates, the
ratios of expense costs to plant costs range significantly from ITC's
relatively low ratio of 1.5:1 to Covad's ratio of 8:1. On average, however,
net plant amounts to about 38%, approximately one-third of total entry
costs for this sample. In other words,for every dollarof investment in plant
and equipment, an additional$2 of entry costs are incurred on average.
There is no reason to suspect that these additional entry costs are less sunk
than plant and
equipment, but there is good reason to believe such costs are
40
more sunk.
When considering the prospects and sustainability of competitive
entry in telecommunications markets, therefore, economies of scale and
sunk costs cannot be ignored. Nor can the focus on such economies and
sunk costs be limited to network investment. Indeed, as revealed in the
following Sections, the extent of scale economies is an important
determinant not only in the level of industry concentration, but also in the
type of firms that exist in equilibrium. As the model explains infra, size
matters, but in conflicting ways.
FORM 10-Q (Aug. 14,2001), availableat http://www.talk.com/; NORTHPOINT, 2001

SECOND

QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 14, 2001), availableat http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data

/1080558/00009296240000117510000929624-00-001175.txt; ITCADELTACOM, INC., 2001
SECOND QUARTER FORM 10-Q (Aug. 14, 2001), availableat http:llwww.sec.govlArchivesl
edgarldata/104195410000928385015015251 dl0q.txt; US LEC CORP., 2001 SECOND
QUARTER FoRM 10-Q (Aug. 6, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/ Archives
Iedgar/datall0542901000101706201500698/dlOq.txt.
40. Plant and equipment can at least be sold in some instances.
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Unbundling and the Necessity of CreatingSufficient
Nonincumbent Demand

One of the centerpieces of the 1996 Act is the unbundling obligation
imposed on the ILECs. 4 ' The original idea behind unbundling is that
because there are high entry barriers into the local access market...
unbundling-i.e., a weak form of divestiture-would permit new firms to
"leapfrog" those barriers to accelerate the pace of competition. In its most
simple form, unbundling should lead to new network-based competition by
providing new entrants initially with the appearance of "ubiquity" and
economies of scope necessary to enter a very costly business-i.e., the
entrant would first develop its customer base, and (because it has no desire
to purchase its primary inputs of production from its rivals) would then
build-out as conditions warrant. Such a strategy is often referred to as a
"smart-build" approach. This is precisely what the FCC did in its 1980
MTS/WATS
Resale Decision to great success for the U.S. long-distance
42
market.
While the development of competition in the interexchange industry
provides important insights, it is crucial to understand that the scale and/or
density economies in the local market are more significant than in
long-haul networks. Consequently, it is unclear whether individual firms
purchasing unbundled network elements will ever acquire sufficient market
share to justify the construction of networks for their exclusive use.
Without the ability to obtain alternative capacity, however, these firms'
dependence on the recalcitrant incumbent will adversely affect their ability
to succeed in the long run.
This is not to say that the unbundling provisions of the 1996 Act are a
failure and should be eliminated. On the contrary, unbundling is critical to
developing sufficient nonincumbent demand for new network-based
facility investment to warrant the entry of an ADCo. That is to say, as
demand for network elements becomes less concentrated (i.e., the ILEC
does not serve all customers), the potential for rapid and large migrations of
demand off the incumbent's network to an alternative network exists.
While the dominant incumbent provider will rarely, if ever, demand the
facilities of an alternative element supplier, the risk of entry by a
competitor is considerable without existing demand for elements. (The
proverbial "build it and they will come" proved successful in Hollywood,
but not for CLECs.) Yet, if unbundling migrates substantial portions of
41. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (Supp. V 2000).
42. See NAFTEL & SPIWAK, supra note 4, at 208. The term "smart build" has other
meanings as well. In some contexts, for example, "smart build" refers to a slow, meticulous
buildout strategy designed to maximize market potential with limited capital resources.
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telecommunications demand to new entrants, then an ADCo can enter and
consolidate (or aggregate) this new nonincumbent demand for network
elements dispersed among the various firms who currently purchase UNEs
from the incumbent, much like building a shopping center with your anchor
tenants already secured. In so doing, network-based entry occurs both in
the form of new alternative network construction, and in terms of new
technology investment (e.g., interconnecting a sophisticated database to the
incumbents' advanced intelligent network ("AIN")) to permit advanced
managed-IP products and services. Large-numbers competition occurs at
the retail and application level, whereas small-numbers competition occurs
at the wholesale or network level. This arrangement is most compatible
with the underlying economics of the telecommunications industry.

III. THE CURRENT SITUATION: ENTRY AFTER THE 1996 ACT
In this Section, this Article examines two primary forms of CLEC
entry strategy observed since the passage of the 1996 Act. Entry strategies
are varied, so it is difficult to classify CLECs into broad categories.
However, there appear to be two very different entry modes at a high level
of generality in use: entrants that depend heavily on ILEC facilities, and
those that do not. While these entry strategies are apparently quite different,
similarities exist between the two. Nearly all entrants, for example, must
deal with the ILEC in some way.
A.

Element-DependentEntrants: The "Buyers"

First, there are those entrants that rely heavily on the elements of the
ILEC (the dominant incumbent, integrated supplier) called elementdependent entrants ("EDEs"). This group of entrants ranges from those
using total service resale to those combining ILECs' local distribution
plant, from local loops to high capacity circuits, with self-supplied
elements. DSL providers, for example, rely on ILEC loops and collocation
space. Switch-based entrants also rely almost exclusively on ILEC loop
plant and provisioning labor, such as hot-cuts, which is combined with selfsupplied switching. UNE-P, or the combination of loops, local switching,
and transport, is an element-dependent entry strategy that relies heavily on
ILEC elements. In some cases, however, the UNE-P CLECs integrate their
own technology into the platform to customize the service. 43 In fact, with
the exception of total service resale, virtually all EDEs integrate some type
43. For example, Z-Tel Communications integrates a variety of call control features,
Internet functionality, and voicemail with the UNE-P. Z TEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 2000
Annual FoRM 10-K (Mar. 28, 2000), available at http://www.tenkwizard.comfiles.php?
sym=ZTEL&repo=tenk&ind=-I&st=2&&page=2&extras=0.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

of facilities with the ILEC network. Thus, as noted above, while EDEs may
not be new "network" facilities-based entrants, they should nonetheless be
considered to be facilities-based entrants.
A problem faced by all EDEs is the ILECs' incentive to impede new
entry, and examples of these incentives in action are readily available. 44
44. See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, CLECs Blame Bells, Bells Blame Hookups, Some Blame
Agencies, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2000, at El; Peter S. Goodman, FCC Chief Stresses Phone
Competition, WASH. POST, May 8, 2001, at El. Indeed, the incumbents are keeping the
FCC's Enforcement Bureau busier than ever. For example:
"

On September 14, 2001, the FCC's Enforcement Bureau announced that it
entered into a Consent Decree with Verizon Communications, Inc.
("Verizon"), under which Verizon will make a "voluntary payment" of
$77,000 to the U.S. Treasury and will take certain remedial actions
regarding its collocation practices. Verizon Comms., Inc., Order, 16
F.C.C.R. 16270 (Sept. 14, 2001).

o

On May 29, 2001, the FCC affirmed the $88,000 fine imposed by the
Commission's Enforcement Bureau in March 2001 against SBC
Communications, Inc. ("SBC") for violating reporting requirements that
the Commission imposed pursuant to its approval of the merger
application of SBC and Ameritech. SBC Comms., Inc., Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture, Order on Review, 16 F.C.C.R. 12306, 23 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1547 (May 29, 2001).

o

Similarly, on January 18, 2001, the FCC sought to fine SBC $94,500 after
an independent audit discovered that SBC failed to comply with the FCC's
rules that require incumbent telephone companies to allow competing
telephone companies to place equipment in the incumbents' offices; in
particular, the Commission found that SBC failed to post promptly notices
of all incumbent-owned sites that have run out of collocation space so
competitors do not waste time and resources applying for collocation
space where none exists. SBC Comms., Inc., Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, Notice of Apparent Liabilityfor Forfeiture, 16 F.C.C.R. 1012
(Jan. 18, 2001).

"

On November 2, 2000, the FCC settled with BellSouth Corporation to
have them make a "voluntary payment" of $750,000 to the U.S. Treasury
and to take important steps to improve its compliance with FCC rules
relating to the negotiation of interconnection agreements between
competing carriers. BellSouth Corp., Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 21756 (Nov. 2,
2000). Indeed, the FCC's investigation disclosed that, for more than six
months in 1999, BellSouth failed to provide a competitor with cost data to
support BellSouth's proposed prices for unbundled copper loops, despite
the competitor's written request for such data. Id. par. 5. In addition to
the $750,000 voluntary payment, the Consent Decree obligates BellSouth
to adopt procedures for expedited access to confidential information,
including issuance of a standard nondisclosure agreement that complies
with the relevant FCC rules, and to adopt procedures for competitors to
elevate disputes regarding disclosure of confidential information to higher
levels within BellSouth. Id paras. 13, 15. In addition, BellSouth will
provide training to its negotiators concerning the relevant statutory and
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Additionally, EDEs are subject somewhat to the whims of regulation. Past
and potential regulatory failures, and the frequent capture of regulatory
agencies by the ILECs, make element-dependent entry a somewhat risky
endeavor. 5 Those risks, however, are at least partially offset by the
decreased risk provided by the reduction in sunk cost investments. Because
regulators can substantially impact the S46
financial condition of EDEs,
regulatory costs for EDEs can be substantial.
Opportunities for sabotage of EDEs by regulators are always at hand.
The FCC, for example, has shown a willingness to remove elements from
the list of unbundled elements for less than compelling reasons. 47 For
example, the FCC does not require that the ILEC provide unbundled local
switching to CLECs whose customers have more than three access lines
and are located within the densest markets. The basis for the FCC's
switching exclusions was that a few CLECs had deployed switching
equipment in some dense markets. 48 Notably, many of these switches were
deployed by now-bankrupt CLECs, and much of that switching capacity

regulatory requirements, as well as BellSouth's revised procedure. Iad
para. 14.
Notwithstanding these ostensible enforcement actions by the FCC (which are supposed to be
one of the centerpieces of Chairman Michael Powell's agenda for the FCC), what is
extremely important to recognize here is that these cases are the administrative equivalent of
a "no contest" plea. Indeed, as there is no formal record kept of the proceeding and guilty
parties are only required to make a "voluntary contribution to the U.S. Treasury" as part of
the settlement, the FCC has very deliberately refused to make an explicit finding of fact. As
a legal matter, therefore, these settlements have little or no probative weight in a subsequent
criminal or civil court of law. Besides, if a firm perceives it will make one dollar more by
deterrence than by competition, then that firm will always choose deterrence.
45. See Lawrence J. Spiwak, The FourHorsemen of the BroadbandApocalypse, COMM
WEEK INT'L, April 1, 2002. For a more detailed exegesis of the FCC's regulatory failures of
the last several years, see generally NAFrEL & SPIWAK, supra note 5.
46. Despite the problems with element-dependent entry, the EDE entry strategy is today
the most effective at providing consumer choice in local telecommunications. In fact, those
EDEs with the greatest reliance on the ILEC are most successful in acquiring market share.
Element-dependent strategies such as UNE-P allow for the rapid accumulation of market
share without the need to sink costs in the network. The relative success of EDEs,
particularly UNE-P CLECs, perhaps has reduced regulatory risks. In the regulatory arena, a
customer base is a constituency, and UNE-P CLECs may have acquired sufficient market
share to discourage regulatory sabotage of that particular entry strategy.
47. See, e.g., Review of Reg. Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomm.
Servs., Notice of ProposedRule Making, CC Docket No. 01-337 (Dec. 20, 2001), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publicattachmatch/FCC-01-360Al.pdf;
Review of the
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, CC Docket No. 01-339 (Dec. 20, 2001), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs..publiclattachmatch/FCC-01-339A1.pdf.
48. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 15
F.C.C.R. 3696, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 888 (1999).
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was not designed for the port-side services that substitute for unbundled
switching. The switching exclusion is currently being reconsidered at the
FCC, however. Further, the FCC is presently considering an effort by the
ILECs to eliminate high-capacity circuits from the list of unbundled
elements. Generally, high-capacity unbundled loops can be more than half
as costly as equivalent special access service purchased out of ILEC retail
tariffs. Thus, the ILECs' desire to remove high-capacity circuits from the
list of unbundled elements is apparent. And, the FCC's review of section
271 applications to permit ILECs to vertically reintegrate and to provide inregion interLATA service appears
now to be little more than a formality,
49
with approval a near-guarantee.
While excluding particular elements from the list of unbundled
elements certainly interferes with their purchase, high prices for elements
can be an equally effective deterrent to entry. Important to the purchase of
the ILECs' elements is that the price of these elements is supposedly set
equal to total element long run incremental costs ("TELRIC"). 50 ILECs
strongly oppose TELRIC pricing, and the pricing standard has been
challenged in court since its conception in the FCC's First Report and
Order implementing section 251 of the 1996 Act.5 Generally, the ILECs
oppose TELRIC pricing because the prices for elements are alleged to be
confiscatory (i.e., are "too low" or "below costs") and therefore somehow
result in unlawful "takings.
49. See NAFrEL & SPIWAK, supra note 4,at 226-31.
50. TELRIC is a method of determining the cost of telephone service based on the
forward-looking incremental cost of equipment and labor without taking into account the
historical, or embedded, cost. The pricing method is based on a hypothetical network using
the most efficient technology available. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.503, 51.505 (2000);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, First
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996) [hereinafter First
Report and Order], vacated by Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997),
remanded by Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, Gen.
Comms., Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 531 U.S. 1124 (2001).
51. FirstReport and Order,supra note 50, paras. 555-607, affd in part and vacated in
part sub nom. Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) and
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), aff'd in part and vacated in part on remand,
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon
Comms. Corp. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001); Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Orderon Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 13042, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1057 (1996); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 19738, 5
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420 (1996); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of
ProposedRule Making, 12 F.C.C.R. 12460, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1206 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Verizon Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 2001 WL 883672
(U.S. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 00-511); Reply Brief for Petitioners, Verizon Comms., Inc. v.
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Some industry pundits, particularly those sympathetic to ILEC
positions, believe that TELRIC pricing will be phased out and that
eventually element prices will be based more on historical or opportunity
costs than on forward-looking costs. There is little evidence from either the
FCC or state regulatory commissions that TELRIC will be abandoned, or
that historical costs, properly measured, exceed TELRIC. Nevertheless, the
risk of dramatic changes in element rates (perhaps due to changes in
pricing standard) cannot be trivialized. 53 Today, element rates are
determined by regulatory fiat, and regulators can be fickle. Element-rate
sabotage is a constant, though perhaps weak, threat.
Moreover, as Table 1 illustrates, those CLECs with a heavy
dependence on ILEC facilities are required to sink other significant entry
costs as well. For example, the sunk costs of systems and customer
acquisition are not small. Nevertheless, the sunk costs of an elementdependent entry strategy are much less than those of a network-based entry
strategy. Network facilities can be a severe drain on an entrant's resources
and they substantially raise the risk of entry. Further, the speed with which
customers can be acquired may not allow the entrant to exhaust the
inherent scale economies in telecommunications plant.
Despite these risks of investing in telecommunications plants, some
EDEs have duplicated major components of the ILECs' network to provide
services. For example, switch-based CLECs typically acquire loop facilities
from the ILEC, but cross-connect those loops to their switch and collocated
equipment. DSL providers, similarly, cross-connect loop plant over to their
collocation. While this hybrid element-facilities approach reduces reliance
on the ILEC, substantial sunk costs are nonetheless required. Further, given
the highly manual loop cutover process, the degrees of freedom for
sabotage are expanded.

FCC, 2001 WL 893893 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 00-511); Respondent's Brief, FCC v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 2001 WL 705629 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 00-511, 00-555, 00-587, 00590, 00-602); Respondent's Brief, WorldCom, Inc. v. Verizon Comms., Inc., 2001 WL
881072 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 00-555, 00-587, 00-590); Petitioner's Brief, Verizon
Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 2001 WL 705546 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 00-511). Comments of
Verizon Comms., Inc. Before the Nat'l Telecomms. and Info. Admin., Request for
Comments on Deployment of Broadband Networks and Advanced Telecommunications,
Docket No. 011109273-1273-01, (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/broadband/comments/verizon/verizon.htn.
53. First Report and Order, supra note 50, paras. 555-607 (noting that the FCC's
decision to adopt the TELRIC pricing methodology is on certiorariwith the Supreme Court
and oral arguments were held on October 10, 2001). Cf. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753
(upholding the FCC's generic authority to develop a pricing methodology under the 1996
Act).
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The "smart-build" approach, where facilities are deployed in a highly
controlled and meticulous fashion, has met with limited success, as have
virtually all CLEC entry strategies. Nevertheless, the heavy burden of
facilities deployment and the slow, arduous customer acquisition process
have sent many CLECs to the grave. 4 Further,while the light use of ILEC
facilities reduces reliance on the reluctantsupplier,the ability of the ILECs
to disrupt CLECs' business plans is not removed. Indeed, in some cases,
those CLECs deploying their own plant to complement the ILECs'
elements require even more ILEC intervention to provide service (e.g., the
manual hot-cut process) than the more pure EDEs.
These hybrid entrants-those using both ILEC elements and their
own facilities-represent the bulk of CLEC bankruptcies over the past year
or so. This group consists primarily of those providers adopting the "build
it and they will come" business plan. Not all of the hybrids will fail,
however. On the other hand, other CLECs, with hundreds of millions in
debt and slow revenue growth, probably never had a chance.5 ' DSL
provider Northpoint, for example, carried about $500 million in debt; $24
million in quarterly revenues, growing at 10% quarterly; and just over $100
million in quarterly costs, growing at 20% quarterly. This includes cost of
goods sold and sales, general and administrative costs. As such, Northpoint
and similarly situated CLECs were doomed from the outset.
While hope remains for a few of the hybrid entrants, the impact of the
hybrid entrant on competition unfortunately will be de minimis. For
example, switch-based CLECs face a severe constraint on migrating
customers to their network: the highly manual hot-cut process. Every
customer a switch-based CLEC acquires must be hot-cut over to the
CLEC's collocation equipment.
Consider the effect of hot-cuts on competition in New York. In New
York, about 7,000 hot-cuts are performed each month.56 Assuming a 4%
monthly chum rate, the number of access lines that CLECs can service at
54. A recent NEW YORK TIMES article illustrates this fact, noting that during 2001 the
number of CLECs has declined from more than 200 to about 75. See Eve Tahmincioglu, A
Phone Upstart,Still Annoying the Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, § 3, at 6.
55. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman & Deborah Solomon, Telecom Debt Debacle Could
Lead to Losses of HistoricProportions,WALL ST. J., May 11, 2001, at Al.
56. This estimate is based on data from December 2000, when Verizon performed
6,878 hot-cuts. Letter to Honorable Janet H. Deixler, Secretary, New York Public Service
Commission, Three Empire State Plaza, Albany, New York 12223 from William D. Smith,
Senior Regulatory Counsel, Verizon, New York, Inc. 1095 Ave. of the Americas, Room
3733, New York, NY 10036, Re: Cases 97-C-0271and 99-C-0949 (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file
with Journal). While the 6,000 hot-cuts is an averaged level of demand, hot-cuts do have a
physical capacity constraint that is far less than that for UNE-P, because UNE-P migration,
in most cases, does not require manual intervention.
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existing hot-cut rates inNew York in three years is about 135,000 lines,
including the effect of chum. According to FCC ARMIS data, there are
about 12 million access lines in New York, and this figure has been
growing at about 0.25% per month during the past five years.57 After three
years of hot-cuts, roughly 1% of the total New York market could be
served by switch-based CLECs.5s Even with no chum, the Percent of
customers that switch-based CLECs could service is only 1.85%.
As a point of reference, in December 2000, about 300,000 UNE-P and
UNE-P equivalent lines were provisioned to CLECs. 0 In other words,
UNE-P can produce a level of competition in a single month that switchbased CLECs cannot exceed even after three years (even with zero chum).
In fact, UNE-P can provide service to nearly ten times as many customers
in six months than could switch-based CLECs after ten years of hot-cuts,
assuming current hot-cut levels. 61 As discussed supra, the rapid migration
of customers to EDEs is important for the future of network-based
competition.
B.

Network-Based Entrants: The "Builders"

While we divide entrants into EDEs and network-based entrants
("NBEs"), it is generally the case that all CLECs use the incumbent's
network to some degree. NBE means carriers that rely more heavily on
their own facilities, using the dominant incumbent's network only in
special circumstances. CLECs in this group at the time of this writing
include Time Warner Telecom, XO Communications, RCN, and bankrupt
firms such as Teligent and Winstar. 62 NBEs generally target medium-large
57. ARMIS Form 43-08 (multiple years), at http:llwww.fcc.gov/ccb/armis.
58. Id. The estimated CLEC share is computed as the net sum of the hot-cut access lines
growing at 7,000 hot-cuts per month, but declining at 4% per month on the cumulative stock
of CLEC lines, divided by the forecast access lines of Verizon (growing at 0.25% per
month).
59. Id. The hot-cut customer base is assumed to grow at 7,000 lines per month, with no
customer chum on the existing stock.
60. Letter to Honorable Janet H. Deixler, supra note 56. UNE-P migration levels are
based on Verizon and CLEC customer activations during Dec. 2000. Both Verizon and
CLEC activations are included because they are functionally equivalent and, therefore, are a
better measure of account-activation capacity.
61. The estimated CLEC share on TNE-P is computed as the net sum of migrated
UNE-P access lines growing at 300,000 migrations per month, but declining at 4% per
month on the cumulative stock of CLEC UNE-P lines, divided by the forecast access lines
of Verizon (growing at .025% per month). See footnote 59 for computations of hot-cut
lines.
62. C.f Richard Waters, Crunch Time for the US Telecoms Industry, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2001, at 26. Neither Time Warner nor XO Communications serves the mass market of
analog telephone service.
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and large businesses, and possibly residential multiple-dwelling units in
metropolitan markets.
The sunk costs and economies of scale endemic in the local exchange
market are discussed supra. Sunk costs raise the risk of entry, and the
economies of scale associated with fixed/sunk costs require large market
shares to attain profitability. The CLEC industry today is well aware of the
difficulty of achieving scale economies and doing so relatively quickly.
The capital required of the NBE is substantial. As shown in Table 1,
entry costs for XO Communications exceed $11 billion. Despite these large
entry costs, about a third of which is in plant, the addressable market of XO
Communications is relatively small. RCN Communications, with a network
construction that is limited to the most densely populated areas, has entry
costs of nearly $6 billion for a total addressable market of about 1.5 million
households (totaling 1.3% of U.S. households). Access to this kind of
capital by a large number of CLECs is unlikely.
Moreover, just as with the EDEs, the regulatory risks for NBEs are far
from trivial. Permits and other government approval costs, again, mostly
sunk in nature, average about 10% of total project costs. 63 Given that these
costs are incurred prior to even receiving permission to construct, up-front
investments in lengthy regulatory efforts substantially increase risk. In
some cases, permission is not granted or is too costly, and these projects are
consequently aborted.
While it seems that network-based entry would eliminate the
prospects for ILEC strategic, anticompetitive behavior, even network-based
entrants run into trouble with the incumbents. As one NBE observed,
"When you go to the incumbents, the inventory of conduit always seems to
be shrinking. They want you to go out and dig up the street and run up your
own costs." 64 Thus, even those entrants that are network-based in nearly
every respect must interact with the ILEC.
Moreover, the omnipresent regulatory risk in telecommunications
even impacts the NBEs: "We're in a legal struggle right now where [the
incumbent is] trying to say that we don't meet the definition of a CLEC
because we're a 'carriers' carrier.' They don't want to unbundle
anything."" Accordingly, it appears that even dividing up entrants as
element-dependent or networked-based is problematic. Every entrant must
deal with the incumbent and is a potential victim of sabotage; it is just a
matter of degree.

63. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 10.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id.
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IV. THE MODEL
The review of current entry strategies reveals two common themes.
First, the dominant, vertically integrated incumbent firm has powerful
incentives to hinder, if not completely put out of action, those CLECs
relying on its unbundled elements to provide service. When an ILEC sells
an unbundled loop to a CLEC in the wholesale market, that loop will
almost certainly be used to serve a current customer of the ILEC in the
retail market. If service provision is mutually exclusive, then the ILEC will
lose that customer and the monthly margin associated with that customer. If
the regulated price for elements does not compensate the ILEC fully for its
cost and lost margin, then the ILEC is motivated to sabotage the
transaction. Second, entry into the local exchange market by a large
number of providers likely will require access to unbundled elements
supplied by either the ILEC or a CLEC.
These basic ideas, mixed with the influence of scale economies and
regulation, serve as the foundation for the economic model of incentives
presented in this Section. While the presentation of the model is greatly
simplified for consumption by a broad audience, the model is technical by
its very nature. Numerical examples are provided at the end of the Section
for those wanting to avoid the more technical presentation.
A.

PrimaryAssumptions of the Model

All analyses are based on a particular set of assumptions, and this
analysis is no exception. The assumptions chosen here simplify the analysis
while capturing the salient features of the telecommunications markets
under investigation. The assumptions used in the model here include the
following:
(a) There is a large, integrated (wholesale and retail) incumbent (the
ILEC) that is legally obligated to sell unbundled network elements to retail
competitors at regulated prices;
(b) These incumbents may "sabotage" this process through nonprice
means;
(c) Scale (or density) economies exist in network or wholesale
operations, and these economies may be substantial;
(d) While scale economies may exist in retail operations, these
economies are smaller than those in wholesale operations; and
(e) Wholesale services and elements are required to provide retail
services, on a "one-for-one" basis.
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The following notation simplifies the model:
MS.

retail market share (% of total market sales) enjoyed by
firmj
j = 1 dominant firm
j = i other integrated finns
j = a, b, c,.. stand-alone, nondominant retail firms;

S,

wholesale market share (% of total market sales)
enjoyed by firm k
k = 1 dominant firm
k = i other integrated firms
k = w stand-alone, nondominant retail firms;

y

typical retail margin (revenues less retail costs and other
service costs on a per-customer basis);

C(S)

total economic costs of a network of "size" S,
representing all costs of the physical network and its
operations with C'>0, C" <0, and C(0) = 0;66

f

regulated price of a piece of the network ("elements")
used to provide service to retail customers;

z

per-unit costs imposed on a competitor by a dominant
provider of elements that do not result in a revenue to
the provider, i.e. nefarious "sabotage";
unregulated price of a network element sold by an
integrated, nondominant firm, to a retail competitor of
the seller;

r

unregulated price of a network element sold by a firm
having no other business to a firm offering retail
services.

66. The notation C'(S) indicates marginal cost, where marginal cost is the first
derivative of the cost function with respect to the quantity of element produced. The second
derivative of the cost function is C"(S). These assumptions merely imply that producing
elements is costly (C'(S) > 0), but that there are scale economies in this process (C"(S) 0)
and no fixed costs (C(0) = 0). Economies of scale could be defined as declining average cost
(i.e., fixed costs are positive) with no change in the conclusions of the paper.
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The following additional "empirical generalizations" are used in what
follows: (a) the incumbent, integrated firm does not wish to sell elements to
competitors at price f; and (b) margins and prices are such that retail
competition is viable if retail competitors are able to obtain elements at the
long-run average costs of an efficient competitor. The first generalization
implies that the regulated rate for the element is below the opportunity cost
of the element for the dominant incumbent, whereas the second
generalization ensures that competition is viable and thus a reasonable
expectation and policy goal.
B.

The Cost of Selling Elements

The next step in the analysis is to characterize the opportunity costs of
selling elements by integrated and unintegrated firms. Consider an
integrated firm with network market share S and retail market share MS.
The marginal opportunity cost of transferring control of one element to a
competitor, t, is then:
t=C'(S)+ MS. y

(2)

where the first term, C'(S), represents the ordinary marginal cost of an
element given a network of size S.67 The second term, MS. y, illustrates the
potential impact of the sale on the retail portion of the seller's operations.
Given a retail market share of MS, the (naive) probability that the sale of
the element results in a lost retail account is MS. In other words, if the
seller has 50% of the market, then there is a 50% chance that the
purchaser of the element is then using that element to serve an existing
customer of the seller. Since a typical account produces a margin of y, the
expected lost retail margin on the sale is MS. •y, and the total cost of the
element transfer is therefore C'(S) + MS • y, the marginal cost plus the lost
retail margin of the element.' s

67. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR") calls for a price equal to t.
TELRIC pricing is roughly equivalent to average cost pricing, or C(S)IS.
68. The Authors assume, for simplicity, that the retail margin Y is not affected by the
sale of one element.
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Two important points arise here. First, a seller with a larger network
(i.e., S is larger) enjoys a lower marginal cost; if Ski > S., then C'(Sl) <

C'(Sk2). In other words, there are economies of scale. Second, a seller with a
larger retail operation faces a higher opportunity cost, t, since the sale of an
element to a competitor is more likely to result in a lost retail account. The
relationships between the opportunity cost, C'(S) + MS. 'y,and the shares S
and MS are illustrated in Figure 1.

C'(O) +

c'(0 + S.
NS7

'(S + ......................................................................

C

4

()

+7 ..............

C(S) + MSy

C(s)

C'(1) +A45.7.............C(S)
0

S

1

0

Panel A

MS
Panel B.

Figure 1. Opportunity Cost and Market Share
The relationship between wholesale market share and opportunity
costs is illustrated in Panel A. For a given market share and retail margin,
opportunity costs are declining in wholesale market share. This relationship
also implies that marginal cost, C'(S), is declining in wholesale market
share (there are economies of scale). Panel B illustrates the relationship
between retail market share and opportunity costs. With marginal
production cost constant, the larger the market share of the firm, the larger
the opportunity cost. This relationship is based on the expected relationship
between the forgone retail margin and the sale of an element, since
marginal production costs are constant.
Because a wholesale-only firm has no retail market share, the
opportunity cost of providing an element for a wholesale-only firm is just
C'(S). Given the existence of scale economies, a price of C'(S) is not
consistent with long-term financial success. Scale economies imply that
marginal cost lies below average cost, so that a price equal to marginal cost
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does not fully recover the total cost of the firm. Long-run average cost,
C(S)/S, is the minimum price consistent with viability of a wholesale-only
seller.69
C.

The Price of Elements

The next step in the model is to analyze the conditions under which
element sales can be made. Figure 2 illustrates the opportunity cost to the
dominant firm from selling one or a few elements, and the regulated level
of remuneration they obtain from such sales (P).

c'(s) + 'Y.. .................

C'(S)

t>
0

MS1

1

Figure 2. Revenue, Opportunity Cost and Market Share
The model assumes on Figure 2 that i is sufficiently high: f > C(S,),
where i exceeds the long-run incremental cost of the dominant firm. This is
not the same as assuming f is remunerative, however, since scale
economies are present. The analyses to follow do not depend on this
relationship.
Figure 2 illustrates an important fact: the dominant incumbent is
willing to sell an element at price of f only if MS, < MS * where t < f. At
all higher market shares, the opportunity cost t exceeds f and the incumbent
is unwilling to sell elements. This unwillingness to sell elements is driven
by the lost retail margin of the dominant incumbent MS. -y The conclusion
is strengthened if y falls as element sales are made because the seller is
marginalizing; the elements reduce the margin on all units sold in the retail
operation of the seller.70 Thus, if element sales increase price competition in

69. Note that C(S)IS is the functional equivalent of TELRIC.
70. Lower retail margins reduce opportunity costs and thus encourage element sales.
However, the seller will not purposefully reduce its retail margin through the sale of
elements to reduce its opportunity costs; the reduced margin affects all customers.
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the retail market, then the incumbent's incentive to sell elements in the
wholesale market is diminished. For simplicity, this model considers the
sale of a single element with presumably negligible effects on retail
margins. Nevertheless, the impact of price competition on the incumbent's
incentives is noteworthy.
D.

Sabotage

"Sabotage," as used in this Article, has a very specific definition, that
is, the ability of a dominant firm to raise the cost of a rival's key input of
production by nonprice behavior. While sabotage can occur in a variety of
contexts, the inherent tension created by the wholesale supplier versus
retail competitor conflict, especially when the wholesale price is regulated,
provides fertile ground for abuse. That is to say, the dominant, integrated
firm is regulated and is legally required to sell elements at price ) . Here,
however, experience highlights the substantial gulf between the
requirements of the 1996 Act and reality. Suppose that the regulated,
dominant firm can impose nonprice costs of z, where z > 0, per element on
buyers, although they will earn no revenue by this action; that is, z is a cost
to buyers but not a revenue to the seller.7' Given this possibility, at what
level, if any, would the dominant firm choose to sell?
It is clear that, when MS, < MS,* the dominant incumbent does not
want to sell elements. Thus, in this situation, z will be set at its maximum
feasible value to impede the sale of elements. Because the sale of a single
element is undesirable, the sale of more than one element is also
undesirable because a larger quantity of elements sold is more likely to
reduce or merely not increase the retail margin.72 Cost-based prices do not,
and should not, incorporate such margins. Thus, cost-based prices are set
below the opportunity cost of the incumbent. Consequently, to the extent
that the incumbent dominant firm is able to impose costs on rivals, its
incentives are to do So. 3
71. Beard et al., supra note 11, at 105.
72. The model shows that the dominant incumbent will not sell one element. This
specification of the model is for convenience, but the same result holds for larger quantities
of elements sold.
73. A similar situation can be observed in the market for multichannel-delivered video
programming. There, both the upstream (programming) and downstream (distribution)
markets are also characterized by high sunk costs and the necessity of achieving scale
economies. For this reason, many cable multiple system operators ("MSOs") sought to
mitigate their risks by vertically integrating with popular cable networks. As access to these
popular cable networks was key to the ability of a competitor-such as satellite providers or
cable overbuilders-to succeed in the market, these vertically integrated cable MSOs had a
strong incentive to engage in strategic anticompetitive conduct against their rivals and
ultimately did. In order to stop such anticompetitive conduct, Congress was forced to
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Sales by a Vertically IntegratedNondominant CLEC Provider

What of element sales by a nondominant vertically integrated CLEC
provider? The above analysis can be extended beyond the dominant
incumbent to any integrated seller, including CLECs. An integrated seller
is willing to sell an element at any price r only if its market share is less
than a critical value determined by C'(S), y, and MS.. For example, an
integrated but nondominant seller would sell an element at price r only if r
> C'(S) + Ms, - y. Of course, such a price may not be remunerative with
substantial scale economies at S, but this relationship serves as a lower
boundary. Note that the value of C(S) may be quite high when Si is small,
as are many CLECs, due to scale economies in network elements.
Competition, to the extent that it exists among sellers of elements,
may impose a maximum price that any given integrated seller can charge
for an element. If so, call that price r . Given S, y, and MS, we may well
have MS, > MS* for r , implying no sales of elements by larger integrated,
unregulated firms because the large retail market share increases the
opportunity costs of such sales. This "no sales of elements" strategy is
more likely when retail operations of the firm (MS) are larger, the retail
margin (y) is larger, and the wholesale operations of the firm (5.) are
smaller. Importantly, the nondominant supplier's wholesale rates are
unregulated, so there is no incentive for strategic nonprice anticompetitive
behavior. The nondominant wholesale firm responds to its incentives by
adjusting price.
Clearly then, the presence of scale economies also affects the
behavior of vertically integrated CLECs as well, but in what way? The
model indicates that while a vertically integrated CLEC may not opt for a
separate wholesale business strategy in addition to its retail operations, the
CLEC will not go out of its way to frustrate entry as the ILEC would. That
is, sabotage is the result of regulatedpricesfor elements that are below the
opportunity cost, but not necessarily the average cost, of the incumbent.
Yet, because the price for elements is not prescribed for unregulated sellers
(CLECs), these firms have no incentive to sabotage transactions. However,
as also noted above, the higher the opportunity cost of the unregulated firm,
the higher is r-the price at which the unregulated firm will sell elements.
promulgate the Program Access rules in the 1992 Cable Act to require vertically integrated
MSOs who deliver programming over satellite to demonstrate why their exclusive
distribution programming contracts were in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. V
1999). For a full exegesis of the Program Access paradigm, see James W. Olson &
Lawrence J. Spiwak, Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Vertical RestraintsImprove LongTerm Cable Industry Market Performance?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283 (1995); see
also George S. Ford & John D. Jackson, Horizontal Concentrationand Vertical Integration
in the Cable Television Industry, 12 REv. OFINDus. ORG. 501, 504-06 (1997).
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The element price ri is decreasing in S, and increasing in MS and y.
Accordingly, a fully integrated nondominant CLEC provider with a
significant market share in the retail market will not affirmatively seek to
thwart entry. Instead, this CLEC will simply offer elements to the wholesale
market at "high" prices. As a result, while an EDE may be able to
purchase some elements from a CLECfor short-term purposes, purchasing
elements from the ILEC is alwaysfraught with peril.
F.

Summary of Model with a Numerical Example

Although of a fairly technical nature, the model described here merely
formalizes a fairly simple and common-sense notion: whenever an
integrated firm sells a network element, or network services, to a retail
competitor, there is a chance that sale will cause the integrated firm to lose
a customer to the buyer. In a sense, such sales to retail competitors involve
the risk of also "selling" a valued customer, and the integrated firm will
recognize this fact in its actions toward those seeking wholesale services.
Further, the risk of such a loss to the seller is related directly to the seller's
market share in the relevant market. For example, a firm with a nearmonopoly in the retail market will almost surely lose a customer if it
supplies a retail competitor with the ability to offer further retail services.
There is, after all, almost nowhere else from which such a customer could
come.
The reluctance of integrated sellers to sell elements or wholesale
services can be measured by the prices they would induce to voluntarily
sell such elements to competitors. Further, in order for elements to be sold
by an integrated firm, the price charged must also be below the potential
earnings of the buyer, so that the sale is economically sound for the retail
firm. The analysis presented here allows this requirement to be analyzed
and understood using simple numerical examples.
To make it concrete, suppose that in some given market the economic
cost of the necessary element-C'(S) in the model-is $15 per month for a
firm with a 50% market share in the wholesale market. Suppose further
that, given the additional costs arising from retailing, an efficient retail
service supplier could expect to earn a margin of $25 per month-7y in the
model-not counting the costs of the wholesale element. This implies that,
given an element of cost $15, a customer in hand is worth $10 ($25-$15).
Then, the prices in the second column of Table 2, rmi. in the model, would
be required by the integrated seller in order to induce them to sell the
element, with these figures related to the integrated firm's market share in
the relevant market.

Number 3]

WHYADCO? WHY NOW?

Table 2. Minimum Element Prices
Retail Market Share

Minimum Element Price

(MS)

(rmin)

0%
25%
50%
75%
100%

15.00
17.50
20.00
22.50
25.00

Although a very simple example, these calculations show that the
willingness of an integrated seller to provide a wholesale service to a retail
competitor is directly and positively related to the retail market share of the
integrated firm. Since a potential competitive retailer that might seek to buy
elements is likely to be operating on lower margins than the existing
dominant firm, element prices of the sort illustrated here can be expected to
substantially reduce the sales of elements and the emergence of
competition at the retail stage.
G.

Market Examples

Because there are no integrated, nondominant CLEC suppliers of
local exchange elements, comparable examples must be found elsewhere.
As an analogy, consider the wholesale market for long-distance services,
where the "element" in this context is access to a nationwide long-distance
network. In the long-distance market, the retail market share variable MS is
properly characterized as the underlying carrier's national market share; the
long-distance market is national in scope. Any customer of an integrated
interexchange carrier is potential prey for a retail carrier using the facilities
of the integrated firm. Assuming y is equal across firms and scale
economies are exhausted for all national long-distance networks, the
expectation is that the price charged by interexchange carriers with large
retail market shares would be higher than those without such shares.
Table 3 provides an analysis of customer perceptions of a
representative sampling of wholesale carrier price points and the respective
carriers' retail market share. The model suggests that AT&T, the largest
retail provider of long-distance service, would have the highest prices for
wholesale capacity. Table 3 indicates that customers and potential
customers of AT&T wholesale capacity view its prices as relatively high,
resulting in the lowest rating for pricing (4.26). Further, those carriers with
the smallest retail market shares are given the highest rating for pricing
(7.00). While the data presented in Table 3 are not perfectly comparable to
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the analysis above (the market share data are not perfectly analogous and
other factors influence price), the general relationship is compatible with
expectations. Furthermore, while AT&T has the largest network and largest
retail market share, MCI-WorldCom is the largest wholesale carrier. It
appears that AT&T's retail market share continues to influence the
company's behavior in the long-distance wholesale market.
Table 3. Pricing Satisfaction and Market Share of Interexchange
Carriers74
Market
Share

Carrier

Pricing
Satisfaction
Index*

AT&T

4.56

0.376

Cable &
Wireless
Global

5.08

0.008

5.57

0.008

Broadwing

4.79

0.006

MCI

5.42

0.225

Qwest

5.98

0.030

Sprint

5.15

0.090

Teleglobe

5.42

0.003

Williams

5.63

0.004

Misc. Small
Carriers
Mean

7.00
5.49

N/A

Index
8.00

Plot of Data Points
with Trend Line

7.00

6.00

Crossing
5.0

WorldCom
0.100

0.200

0.300

* Higher values indicate lower prices.

In stark contrast to the highly competitive market for wholesale
capacity in long-distance services, the wholesale market for the U.S.
wireless industry is immature. The opportunity cost model sheds some light
on this fact. Historically, the margins (y) for wireless service have been
quite high. Further, the wireless carriers have only recently begun to
exhaust scale economies, suggesting C'(S) was large historically. Today,
market shares have somewhat stabilized, allowing wireless carriers to
better assess their opportunity costs. With wireless margins lower, market
shares stable and disparate, and scale economies near exhaustion for some
carriers, the model presented above suggests that a wholesale market in

74. Judy Reed Smith & Taher Bouzayen, Resellers Rate Wholesale Carriers,PHONE+,
March, 2000; Trends in Telephone Service, Federal Communications Commission, August
2001 (Data for year 2000), at Table 10.1.

0.400
MS
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wireless telecommunications may emerge.
Notwithstanding the situation in the United States, the formation of
such a wholesale wireless market is nonetheless well under way in the rest
of the world. These self-described mobile virtual network operators
("MVNOs") such as Virgin Mobile, Sense Communications, and the
75
Financial Times Group (firms that are essentially "marketing machines")
are all making76significant headway in numerous markets in Europe, Asia,
and Australia. Not surprisingly, recent trade press reports reveal that
several U.S. wireless carriers are warming up to the idea of offering their
capacity as wholesale suppliers as well 77

75. See, e.g., Reuters, Branson to Use Virgin Airline as Mobile Weapon, TOTAL
TELECOM, Sept. 3, 2001, available at http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?articlelD=
43387&Pub=TT&categoryid= 828&kw=Branson+touse+Virgin.
76. See, e.g., Telecom NZ's AAPT Looks for Australia MVNO Deals, TOTAL TELECOM,
Sept. 17, 2001, availableat http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?articlelD=43860&Pub=TT&
categoryid=828&kw=Telecom+NZ; Virgin Plans US$550m Asian Spend, Sees HK Partner
Soon, TOTAL TELECOM, June 12, 2001, available at http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?
articlelD=40900&Pub=Tr&categoryid=828&kw=Virgin+ (noting, according to Ross
Cormack, Chief Executive of Virgin Mobile (Asia), that the U.K.-based Virgin Group
"plans to spend US$550 million on expanding its mobile virtual network operations in 10
Asian regions over the next three to five years"); Ray Le Maistre, Operators:MVNOs - Not
All Virgins, ROAM, June 1, 2001, available at http://www.totaltele.com/roam/ view.asp?
articleID=40602&Pub=RM&categoryid=705&kw=Virgins; George Malim, COR Boosts the
Power of Smaller MVNOs, TOTAL TELECOM, May 21, 2001, available at http:llwww.
totaltele.com/view.asp?articlelD=40104&Pub=CWI&categoryid=705&kw=COR;Annie
Turner, Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Taking Root, NEW CARRIER, Apr. 1, 2001,
available at http:lwww.totaltele.comlnewcarrier/view.asp?articleID=39455&Pub=NC&
categoryid=705&kw=Root; Anne Young, FT and the Carphone Warehouse Form MVNO
Deal with Cellnet, TOTAL TELECOM, Mar. 5, 2001, available at http:l/ www.totaltele.
com/view.asp?articlelD=37582&Pub=T&categoryid=625&kw=Carphone; Joanne Taaffe,
Mobile Virtual Network Operators - Marking Out Their Territory, COMMUN. WEEK INT'L,
Mar. 5, 2001, available at http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?articleID=37530&Pub=CWI
&categoryid=705&kw=Mobile+Virtual+Network; Anne Young, MVNOs: A Market
Essential or an Operator's Bete Noire?, TOTAL TELECOM, Feb. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.totaltele.coniLview.asp?articlelD=37255&Pub=TT&categoryid=625&kw=Bete+
Noire; Gerard O'Dwyer, Norwegian MVNO Sees Sense in Nordic Expansion, TOTAL
TELECOM, Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://www.totaltele.com/view.asp?articleID=36637
&Pub=Tr&categoryid=625&kw=Norwegian+MVNO; Emma McClune, 3G Owners Awash
with Virtual PartnerOffers, COMMUN. WEEK INT'L, Jan. 15, 2001, availableat http:llwww.
totaltele.com/view.asp?articlelD=35683&Pub=CWI&categoryid=705&kw=3G+owners.
77. See, e.g., Bruce Christian, Wanted: Channelsfor Wireless, PHONE+, Mar. 2001, at
http://www.phoneplusmag.com/articles/131cover.html; Virgin Teams Up With Sprint for
U.S. Services, REuTERS, Oct. 5, 2001; Sprint, Virgin Form Wireless Joint Venture Aimed at
15- to 30-Year Olds, Bus. J., Oct. 5, 2001, at http://www.kansascity.bizjoumals.com/
kansascity/stories12001/10/01/daly46.html; Thor Olavsrud, Sprint, Virgin Create Wireless
Joint Venture, WIRELESS NEws, Oct. 5, 2001, at http:llwww.intemetnews.comlwireless/
article/0,,10692.898121,00.html.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL AND THE CASE FOR AN ADCO
A.

Emerging Trends

The analysis above indicates that the opportunity cost of selling
elements rises as wholesale market share declines and retail market share
increases (holding the retail margin constant), suggesting the following
possible conclusions. First, there is reason to believe that no integratedfirm
with large retail presence will emerge as an efficient, cost-based supplier
of network elements to retail competitors. Moreover, the regulated,
dominant firm, and any larger integratedfirm, may well be reluctant to
create its own competition through element sales. For both dominant and
nondominant providers, there is a clash between scale economies on the
one hand and retail market share on the other. Size does matter, so to speak,
but in conflicting ways. For an integrated provider offering no elements to
the wholesale market, wholesale (S) and retail market share (MS) are highly
correlated. The opportunity cost of selling elements declines as wholesale
market share increases; the opportunity cost of selling elements increases
as retail market share increases. Thus, it is quite possible that the lowest
cost providers-thoseexhausting economies of scale-do not participatein
the wholesale market, particularlyat betterprices, because of a high retail
market share.
Second, the presence of scale economies suggests that small
wholesale firms, or retailer self-supply, may likewise be noneconomic.
Realizing economies of scale affects profitability; thus, exhausting scale
economies is desirable. However, doing so may be difficult if wholesale
market share is tied directly to retail market share. An integrated firm may
be unable to acquire sufficient retail share to exhaust scale economies at the
wholesale level. The retail market share of the firm, however, may impede
the firm's ability to increase wholesale sales to achieve scale economies by
raising the opportunity cost of element sales. Thus, numerous forces
operate against the prospect of wholesale supply by integrated firms,
whether dominant or nondominant.
Similarly, a large retail market share indicates that the incumbent
will have a significantincentive to sabotageand discriminate againstrivals
in the wholesale market. Further, the scale economies in the local market
are more significant than in long-haul networks and therefore it is unclear
whether individual EDEs will ever acquiresufficient market share to justify
the construction of networkfor their exclusive use. As such, for those firms
that rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the incumbent to provide wholesale
elements atjust and reasonable rates, the economics do not bode well for
long-term viability.
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What, then, is the alternative? The analysis presented here illustrates a
potential market-based solution to this dilemma: the entry of the
wholesale-only finm or ADCo. Such a firm can offer retail entrants the
immediate advantages of larger scale, thus obtaining scale economies in
network operation, without the retail-market-share-driven disincentives to
wholesale supply. In addition, given the wholesale nature of the ADCo and
advances in technology, retail entrants can use the ADCo's facilities (i.e.,
essentially a "dumb pipe") to provide customers with custom-tailored
products and services that the incumbent network is simply unwilling or
unable to provide (e.g., managed IP services). Accordingly, while the
number of local access networks the market can sustain may be few, the
wholesale nature of the ADCo nonetheless permits the number of providers
of advanced telecommunications products and services in the local market
to be many.
Specifically, an ADCo can and is willing to offer elements with an
economic cost of C'(S), and at a fully remunerative price of C(S)IS (i.e.,
average cost). So long as such a firm is able to achieve sufficient scale
economies, it may well be that C(S )IS, < rmin, where:
rmi,

= min{C(S1) +MS 1 , C(S) + MSj .yj

or, equivalently:
rmin = minr + z,C(S i ) + MS•.y.
In other words, the average cost of the ADCo may be below the
opportunity
cost (or minimum element price) of its potential integrated
78
rivals.
Table 2 above can be expanded to include the minimum price of the
ADCo, assuming that the ADCo and the integrated provider have the same
cost function, but that ADCo, by definition, has no retail market share.
Thus, the minimum remunerative element price for ADCo is equal to its
average cost (C(S)/S) or TELRIC-$18.00 in this case.79 As shown in Table
4, ADCo's price is below the integrated firm's price in some cases. As the
retail market share of the integrated firm rises, the ADCo price is below the
integrated firm's price. The difference in prices is the result of the retail

78. If not, then retail firms will pay the integrated providers their opportunity cost.
79. The ADCo cannot sell elements at marginal cost, whereas the incumbent may do so
because its network costs are sunk. In other words, an ADCo would not enter the market,
and incur sunk costs, if its expected price did not exceed marginal cost.
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market share disincentive (MS. y) possessed by the integrated firm.
Table 4. Minimum Element Prices
Integrated Firm's
Retail Market Share
(MS)

Integrated Firm's
Minimum Element
Price

ADCO Minimum
Element Price
(rmfi)

(rmin)

0%
25%
50%
75%
100%

15.00
17.50
20.00
22.50
25.00

18.00
18.00
18.00
18.00
18.00

The condition under which the ADCo can profitably service the
wholesale market does not require that the ADCo exhaust its scale
economies. Even if the ADCo is somewhat less efficient than larger
providers, due to a smaller size, the lack of the retail-driven disincentive
may allow the ADCo to profitably supply a wholesale market. Thus, the
presence of more efficient, integrated firms is immaterial so long as the
retail-driven disincentive to supply the wholesale market is sufficiently
large.
B. Residual Public Interest Benefits-The Impact of the ADCo on
the Incentives of the DominantIncumbent
Perhaps the most important benefit of the ADCo would be its
potential effect on the incentives of the dominant incumbent to exercise
market power (i.e., by raising prices or restricting output) or to engage in
efforts to deter new entry via strategic nonprice behavior.
For example, it may just be possible that an ADCo, and its customers
serving the retail market could grow large enough that the market shares of
the integrated firms, both wholesale and retail, fall sufficiently to render
them valid competitors in the wholesale market.' ° Thus, like structural
separation of the dominant provider that aims to eliminate the retail
disincentive in a more direct way, the ADCo can alter the incentives of the
dominant provider so that supplying the wholesale market at competitive
prices is economic.
More importantly, it may be the case that the presence of an ADCo
will have an even more profound effect on long-term industry structure.
That is to say, ever since the AT&T divestiture, there has been great
80. This result is neither indicated nor required by the model.
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discussion about the prospect of legally mandating incumbents to separate
structurally their network operations into a separate LoopCo." Structural
divestiture, by separating retail and wholesale operations, eliminates the
retail market share disincentive to supply the wholesale market, as well as
the incentive to sabotage. Regardless of the economic merits of such a
structural separation, however, such a notion appears to be a political
nonstarter.8 2 Given the incumbent's inherent incentive to block entry, as
discussed supra,it is nonetheless reasonable to inquire whether there could
be some mechanism or circumstance where an incumbent would find it
more efficient to disaggregate voluntarily its local access.
The presence of an ADCo may just be the catalyst needed to provide
an incumbent with the incentive to disaggregate its network facilities from
its marketing operations voluntarily. If the ADCo reveals any diseconomies
of vertical integration (to the extent they exist), then vertically integrated
firms may choose to divest themselves voluntarily, because it would be
more efficient (i.e., more profitable) for them to do so. This voluntary
restructuring would be the consequence of an ADCo revealing the presence
of diseconomies of scale, scope, or sequence between the retail and
wholesale components of the firm."' A full analysis of this possibility is
81. See Morris, supra note 14.
82. For example, some argue that a LoopCo would be economically unsustainable. See,
e.g., Jeffrey A. Eisenach et al., Regulatory Overkill: Pennsylvania'sProposal to Breakup
Bell Atlantic, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Dec. 16, 1999, at http://www.pff.org/
papucreport.htm. The economics indicate the opposite conclusion, however. First, the
LoopCo's costs are sunk, and it has already achieved the scale economies necessary to be
successful. As such, it will be established in a market capable of sustaining only a few firms.
Second, assuming arguendo that there are no other local access facilities (or even a few), it
is highly likely that regulators will still impose some sort of price regulation on the LoopCo.
As such, it is unclear how a LoopCo would be economically unviable when its operational
costs are guaranteed by regulation. Finally, it may turn out that the LoopCo would exceed
its regulatory rate of return through the market because divestiture has removed its incentive
to discriminate and replaced it with an incentive to sell as much of its product (i.e., local
access) to as many potential buyers as it could find. Indeed, if a LoopCo is really such an
inefficient business proposition, then why did British Telecom reject offers of $11.4 billion
and $25.7 billion respectively for its local access networks from firms who realized the
benefit of breaking out the value of BT's assets via a LoopCo? See Dan Roberts, BTRebuffs
o8bn Offer for Lines, FIN. TlMES, July 30, 2001, § 1, at 19 (quoting potential purchaser as
believing that "BT has ignored the potential of its local loop because any ADSL services
provided by rival operators compete with its own retail division."); Andrew Ward, WestLB
in $25.7bn Offerfor BTFixed-line Network, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001.
83. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. OF POL. ECON., IssuE 3
(JuNE 1961) at 213-25; DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 119-20 (1989);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 8.
A classic example of how changing the underlying structure of the market can force
firms to "voluntarily" disaggregate can be found in AT&T's spin-off of Lucent
Technologies (n6 Bell Labs). To wit, back when AT&T had a total monopoly over
everything short of the spoken word, it was very efficient for AT&T to bring the terminal
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beyond the scope of this model and Article, however.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to shed some light on the path of future
evolution in the competitive telecommunications industry, as well as to
explore its somewhat troubled past and present. While it is always desirable
to break new ground in research, this analysis will not be particularly
groundbreaking to those most familiar with the telecommunications
industry. Indeed, this analysis, in many respects, is a formalization of ideas
shared among industry insiders for decades.84 The economics of the
telecommunications industry, particularly the supply-side economics, has
not changed much over time. Fewness in supply is the rule, not the
exception. Instead, fiber optics and other technological innovations remain
key drivers of industry structure, notwithstanding the inherent economies
of scale and sunk costs of telecommunications networks. As Professors
Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian succinctly state in their book Information
Rules: "Technology changes. Economic laws do not."85 Accordingly, if
equipment sector of the industry "out of the market and into the firm"-i.e., manufacture its
terminal equipment on a vertically integrated basis. In the mid-Eighties, however, as longdistance competition was in its infancy, a more forward-looking FCC [realized] that
competitors should have more than one source of terminal switching equipment (i.e.,
AT&T/Bell Labs). As such, through stringent structural regulation such as standard interfaces and plugs, the FCC essentially carved-out the terminal equipment market to allow for
competing suppliers.
By the mid-1990's, the market for terminal equipment was flourishing. Not only
was there Bell Labs/AT&T, but also other vendors such as Cisco, Siemens and Nortel and a
wide variety of other niche technology players as well. As the result of this competition for
terminal equipment, the equipment vendor side of AT&T found it was losing customers
because, as a corporate entity, it was prohibited from selling to would-be rivals, and the
network/marketing side of AT&T was limited only to what Bell Labs came up with. Given
this changed market structure, it was now more efficient (i.e., more profitable) for AT&T to
disaggregate voluntarily Bell Labs (now Lucent) from AT&T's telephone business (i.e.,
bring the transaction out of the firm and into the market). In so doing, both finms are better
off, as Lucent can now sell to a wide variety of customers, and AT&T now has a choice of
competing terminal equipment vendors who distinguish themselves on both a price and/or
service quality or technological basis. See NAFrEL & SPIWAK, supra note 4, at 35.
84. Indeed, the notion of an ADCo was first fleshed out by Jerry B. Duvall in 1998, and
has been written about frequently since then. See Jerry B. Duvall, Entry by Electric Utilities
Into Regulated Telecommunications Markets: Implications for Public Policy, Paper
Presented Before the Communications Industry Committee, ABA Section of Antitrust Law,
Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, PLLC, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1998) at http:llwww.
ascent.org/research/phoenix-ctrl2.pdf. For sources discussing Duvall's notion, see, for
example, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Utility Entry Into Telecommunications: Exactly How Serious
Are We? (Phoenix Ctr. Policy Paper No. 1, July 1998), available at http://www.phoenixcenter.org/pcpp/PCPP1Final.pdf; NAFTEL & SPIWAK, supra note 4, at 208-09.
85. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 1-2 (1999) (emphasis
added).
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nature is desired, then
network-based competition of a highly fragmented
battle.16
competition policy is fighting a losing
In the most general of terms, this Article discusses important
economic characteristics of local exchange markets and the firms that
participate therein. First, entry into the local exchange market requires
large fixed and sunk costs, making entry risky and necessitating scale
economies. Consequently, only few local access networks can supply the
market. These few local access networks cannot be small, however,
because a large market share is required to realize sufficient scale
economies to compete effectively with the ILECs and survive.
Secondly, acquiring sufficient market share to realize scale economies
may be difficult for entrants that are not wholesale-only firms. Given the
substantial scale economies in local exchange networks, it may not be
possible for a single carrier to acquire sufficient retail market share in a
timely manner to exhaust economies of scale. An integrated firm supplying
the wholesale market is conflicted; the integrated firm's retail market share
raises the opportunity cost of wholesale supply.
Accordingly, if economies of scale are sufficiently large, then
reaching a scale of operation that allows the entrant to compete with the
ILEC may be best achieved through a wholesale-only entry strategy-an
ADCo. The ADCo can consolidate the consumer demand held by retail
CLECs, thereby reducing risk and costs, and expanding output quickly. The
disincentives to wholesale supply possessed by the integrated firm,
furthermore, do not exist for the ADCo, and therefore the ADCo-unlike
the ILEC-has no incentive to sabotage its customers. As a result, the
ADCo provides the answer to the central objective of the 1996 Act: that is,
while the number of local access networks the market can sustain may be
few, the wholesale nature of the ADCo nonetheless permits the number of
providers of advanced telecommunications products and services to be
many, which-after all-is the raisond'tre of market "restructuring."

86. See, e.g., Review of Reg. Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomm.
Servs., Notice of ProposedRule Making, CC Docket No. 01-337 (Dec. 20, 2001), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-01-360Al.pdf. But c.f. Lawrence
J. Spiwak, Outside View: The Broadband Shibboleth, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Dec. 13, 2001,
availableat http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=10122001-052454-2749r.
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